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A TALE OF TWO CONCURRENCES: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
JOHN G. CULHANE*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the landmark decision, Baker v. Vermont,1 the Vermont
Supreme Court held that the state had not honored its constitutional guarantee of "common benefits" to all Vermonters when it
denied same-sex couples the benefits accruing from marriage.
Significantly, the court did not hold the marriage licensing
laws-which had been interpreted by the state to apply only to
opposite-sex couples-unconstitutional. Instead, the matter of how
best to afford the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples was
remitted to the legislature, for determination within "a reasonable

period of time."2 As the court stated, the legislature might either
decide simply to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples, or
instead create "a parallel 'domestic partnership' system or some
equivalent statutory alternative."3 Thus, justice was further
delayed for the three couples who had brought suit back in 1996,
4
and for other same-sex couples in Vermont.
As public reaction to the decision underscored, the court's
approach was certainly politically astute.5 Those on the political
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, and Lecturer, Yale University
School of Medicine (Division of Public Health). I would like to thank Susan Goldberg for her
incisive suggestions and generous encouragement.
1. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
2. Id. at 881.
3. Id. at 867.
4. On April 26, 2000, Governor Howard Dean signed into law An Act Relating to Civil
Unions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 1, §§ 4 & 8, ch. 23, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000). The act
reserves the marriage label for opposite-sex couples,. declaring that "[mlarriage means the
legally recognized union of one man and one woman." Id. § 1201(4). Same-sex couples
continue to be "excluded from the marriage laws of [Vermont]." Id. § 1202(3). As this Essay
argues, this separate-but-equal treatment cannot amount to full equality. Nonetheless, the
legislature's decision to recognize a parallel creation, called "civil union," for same-sex couples
is a substantial step toward that goal. Although a detailed analysis of the myriad benefits
conferred upon same-sex couples-many for the first time in U.S. history-is not the subject
of this Essay, it is worth quoting the Act's central, and startling, provision in full: "Parties
to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law,
whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any
other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage." Id. § 1204(a).
5. The court's unexpected, and perhaps novel, solution to the problem might explain the
long wait (about thirteen months) between oral argument, in November 1998, and decision,
in December 1999.
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right were rendered toothless by the court's related decisions not to
require marriage and to send the matter to the legislature for a
suitable remedy. Opponents of same-sex marriage were left in the
awkward position of having to give the court at least some credit for
its deferential approach, and a nuanced response hardly calls for the

kind of blunderbuss sloganeering that has been the right's
specialty.6

On the other hand, inasmuch as the decision went

7
further than any other state supreme court has been willing to go,
advocates of gay and lesbian civil rights also generally applauded
the court's decision, or at least qualified their criticism.' The
legislature's response was also positive, as argument was generally
limited to the issue of whether to grant full-blown marriage rights
to same-sex couples or create a parallel package of rights that would

6. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Redefining a MarriageMade New in Vermont, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1999, § 4, at 3, LEXIS, News Library (explaining the views of Jay Sekulow, Chief
Counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice, to the effect that the court's logic should
have led it to take the final step of requiring same-sex marriage); Carey Goldberg, Vermont
High CourtBacks Rights of Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1999, at Al, LEXIS, News
Library [hereinafter Goldberg, Rights of Same-Sex Couples] (although disagreeing with the
decision, Craig Bensen, an evangelical pastor and vice president of Take It to the People, was
"happy to see the issue go to the legislature"). A corollary is that any extreme reaction seems
particularly hysterical. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, There Cannot Be a Same-Sex Marriage,
CHI. TRiB., Dec. 23, 1999, at 27, LEXIS, News Library (accusing the court of using "the voice
... of Hitler or Slobodan Milosevic").

7. Appearances to the contrary, the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), did not go quite so far, because it did not hold that the refusal to
grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples was, in fact, unconstitutional. Id. at 67. Rather,
the case was remanded for findings as to whether the state could demonstrate a compelling
interest in its position. Id. at 68. The trial judge assigned to the remand found that such
interest had not been demonstrated. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). While the case was on its second appeal to the Hawaii Supreme
Court, however, the voters approved a referendum allowing the state legislature to amend the
state's constitution to declare that marriage is solely between a man and a woman. Sam
Howe Verhovek, From Same-Sex Marriageto Gambling, Voters Speak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1998, at B1, LEXIS, News Library. In light of that development, the court recently ruled that
the case before it was moot. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. Dec. 9,
1999). Unresolved, though, is the issue of whether the state can deny same-sex couples the
benefits that married couples enjoy.
8. See Goldberg, Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 6 (citing the positive reaction
of Matt Coles, director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union: "it's astonishing"); Homosexual Rights, FACTs ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Dec. 23,
1999, E3 at 933, LEXIS, News Library, Facts File (quoting Beatrice Dohrn, Legal Director for
the Lambda Legal Defense Fund: "'We've never gotten this kind of official recognition.
They're saying it's a social good that we be who we are, that we be in strong and loving
families.'). But see John C. Campbell, Letter to the Editor, A Gay-Rights Victory in Vermont,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at A28, LEXIS, News Library (pointing out practical problems of
any solution short of marriage); Steve Chapman, Do Conservatives Really Believe in
Marriage?,CHI. TRM., Dec. 26, 1999, at 23, LEXIS, News Library (denying same-sex couples
access to marriage "serves mainly to harm children").
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survive any subsequent judicial challenge.9 The debate resulted in
the creation of a new legal creature, called the "civil union," which
attempts to convey all the benefits of marriage-except for the word
itself-upon same-sex couples.' °
Chief Justice Amestoy, writing for the Baker majority, was
candid about the possible negative consequences of simply requiring
the state to issue marriage licenses, noting that similarly progressive decisions by courts in Hawaii and Alaska were subsequently
undone by the legislature and the citizens of those states."
Although political and constitutional realities would have made
such developments less likely in Vermont, 2 the court obviously
thought that avoiding the "m" word stood to achieve a more just
outcome, by depriving opponents of a totem to rally around.
However politically shrewd, the decision-and the legislative
response it effectively encouraged-is deficient in remedy and
(therefore, not surprisingly) in justification for that remedy.
These inadequacies were pierced by Justice Denise Johnson's
partial concurrence: while agreeing that excluding same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage violated the state constitution,
she disagreed with the majority's decision to "punt" the remedy
issue to the legislature.' She would have given the plaintiffs the
remedy they sought: marriage.14
9. See, e.g., Goldberg, Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 6 (comparing the views of
Governor Howard Dean, who supported what became the civil union compromise, with that
of Attorney General William Sorrell, who noted that domestic partners "wouldn't be called
spouses ... and for a number of people, that makes an enormous difference"); William R.
Macklin, Editorial, Ruling Heats Up Same-Sex Debate, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 26, 1999, at
E01, WL, PHILINQ database (discussing view of Vermont House Speaker Michael
Obuchowski, who supports same sex-marriage but believes that domestic partnership is a
more politically attainable solution).
10. See discussion and sources cited supra note 4.
11. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,888 (Vt. 1999).
12. As to the political climate in Vermont, see sources cited supra note 9. It also happens
that the Vermont Constitution is especially difficult to amend. See VT. CONST. ch. II, § 72
(1999) (setting forth the procedure for amendment). Beginning in 1975, amendments can be
proposed only during biennial sessions of the General Assembly "convening every fourth year
thereafter." Id. This means that the next opportunity for such proposals would occur in 2003.
Proposals must be made by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and then approved by a majority
of the House of Representatives. Id. Amendments approved through that process must then
be referred to the next biennial session, and reapproved by a majority of both the Senate and
House. Id. If all of those hurdles are cleared, the General Assembly must then submit the
proposed amendment to the voters, who have the final say. Id. Only if they approve the
amendment by a majority does it finally become part of the state constitution. Id.
13. Baker, 744 A.2d at 897 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
14. Justice Johnson agreed that the state's refusal to grant marriage licenses
unconstitutionally deprived Vermonters of their rights under the Common Benefits Clause,
but dissented from the court's remedial disposition. Her opinion is discussed more fully infra
Part III.
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This Essay explores that concurrence through comparison with
an unexpected source: Justice Roger Traynor's memorable concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5 in which he straightforwardly, but radically, endorsed the principle of strict liability in tort
for latent product defects that cause personal injuries to
consumersl---a principle finally vindicated in California (and
ultimately everywhere) some nineteen years later, in a decision
written by Traynor himself.'"
The similarity between these two concurrences occurred to me
shortly after reading Justice Johnson's opinion. I then spent some
time wondering why. On the surface, after all, there are surely
better candidates for comparison: the Vermont decision involved
constitutional law, while the California case turned on a question of
common law tort; while Baker involved couples disadvantaged by a
state licensing scheme, Escola was a simple personal injury case;
perhaps most significantly, the plaintiffs in Baker were not granted
an immediate remedy, while the plaintiff in Escola recovered
damages under the majority holding.
Yet, the two cases share vital similarities that can be instructively explored. Indeed, this Essay takes the position that Baker's
concurrence is of the same lineage as Escola's.'8 Both opinions
reflect uncommon insight into areas that, while substantively
disparate, share a position at the avant-garde. They grasp that, at
certain points of societal transformation, it is time to articulate
principles that reach beyond what may be strictly necessary to
resolve the case under consideration. Justice Traynor's opinion was
more plainly an extension, because an adequate remedy was at
hand without the principle of strict liability for which he argued. In
contrast, much of Justice Johnson's opinion was taken up by a
discussion of the very inadequacy of the remedy provided by the
majority. The opinions, however, share a refreshing focus on the
kinds of societal changes that compel a reconsideration of underly-

15. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
18. For a broad treatment of the issue of concurring opinions, see Laura Krugman Ray,
The Justices Write Separately: Uses ofthe Concurrenceby the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 777 (1990). Professor Ray identifies and discusses four categories of concurring
opinions: the limiting concurrence, the expansive concurrence, the emphatic concurrence and
the' doctrinal concurrence. Id. at 784-809. Justice Traynor's opinion is a doctrinal
concurrence, but Justice Johnson's is so difficult to categorize that not much is gained by the
effort. Part of the problem, of course, is that the decision is a partial concurrence and a
partial dissent (as to the remedy).

20011

A TALE OF TWO CONCURRENCES

ing assumptions, thereby unmasking the inadequacy of both the
majorities' decisions.
Part II of this Essay discusses Justice Traynor's contribution to
the development of product liability law. Much of this story will be
familiar to torts scholars, but I hope to underscore the reasons that
the doctrinal change he advocated, although "tiny" in result, was of
great, and rare, importance. Part III makes the point that Justice
Johnson's partial concurrence, although likely to be similarly small
in terms of ultimate legal result, will reverberate throughout the
same-sex marriage debate, just as Justice Traynor's did in the
product liability context. Today, the wisdom of the Escola concurrence is taken as commonplace. This Essay will be successful if it
persuades readers that the Baker concurrence deserves the same
privileged status-without the two-decade lag.
II. ESCOLA's ACHIEVEMENT
By 1944, when the Escola concurrence was written, liability for
injuries caused by latent product defects was in a messy state. 19 In
order to appreciate the incisiveness of Justice Traynor's opinion, a
summary of that state follows. The main problem for plaintiffs was
that, unless they could prove negligence, they were remitted to the
Byzantine law of warranty for recovery. Warranty law was
appealing because liability was strict: in selling a consumer good,
sellers warranted that good free from dangerous defects. Inasmuch
as warranty law was, and remains, a hybrid of contract and tort
principles, its application to personal injury cases has always
proven problematic.' The chief obstacle has been privity: because
19. Latent defect cases are the sole source of analysis here. Mainly, but not exclusively,
these are defects of manufacture, not of design. John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product
Liability Reform Within ConsumerExpectation Model: A Comparisonof Approaches Taken
by the United States and the European Union, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 52-55
(1995). These cases are the cleanest because the latency of the defect means that the
consumer is in a position of forced reliance on the seller. This point is explored further later
in this Essay. The argument works less well in the case of consumer awareness of, and
conscious engagement with, the aspect of the product that creates the risk. As has long been
recognized, such engagement may be subtle and difficult to discern, especially in view of the
complexities of product marketing and presentation. See generally Marshall Shapo, A
RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,Function and Legal Liability for
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974) (analyzing the legal development of
products liability and focusing on representations made to the consumer).
20. The problems to be discussed in this Essay are the best known, but the issue of how
to analyze product defect claims brought under a theory of implied warranty has caused
puzzlement in unexpected situations. In Woolworths Ltd. v. Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603, for
example, the Australian High Court had to decide whether the wrongful death statute
afforded a remedy where the triggering death had been caused by a breach of
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warranty law liability was tied to the sale of the good, the injured
consumer could only sue his immediate seller-and then, only if the
consumer himself was the purchaser.2 1 Sometimes courts skirted
this requirement, but at the expense of clarity and consistency.
As demonstrated by Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,22 courts
had a particular appetite for sidestepping the hurdles imposed by
warranty law in so-called "foodstuffs" cases. In Klein, the plaintiff
consumer, whose husband had bought a ham and cheese sandwich
for her, found her dining experience compromised by the presence
of maggots within the refreshment.' She sued both the sandwich
retailer and the manufacturer. As to the manufacturer, Mrs. Klein
had a double privity problem: the immediate seller was the retailer
The court, however, had little
and she was not a purchaser.'
patience for these supposed impediments to recovery. After citing
a number of sources for the proposition that an exception to the rule
should be made for defective food products,' the court looked to
both the realities of current marketing practices and food and drug
It thereby concluded
laws designed to safeguard public health.
that the lack of vertical privity of contract between the consumer
and the manufacturer should not be a barrier to recovery.' It then
quickly dismissed the argument that the wife had not herself been
the purchaser, noting that the point had "been answered by the
ruling hereinbefore made."' The court's conclusion was bolstered
by noting the consequences of a contrary holding. A child would not
be able to recover for injury suffered by drinking a bottle of unwholesome milk purchased by his/her parents, for example.'
contract-implied warranty for an electric globe that exploded-not by a tort, at least not as
pleaded.
21. These privity rules applied in cases ofboth personal injury, Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor
Co., 15 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (N.D. Ill. 1935) (plaintiffs claim only against direct seller of
automobile; argument about implied representation "probably contains much truth," but
change in law should come from legislature), and economic loss, Timberland Lumber Co. v.
Climax Mfg., 61 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir. 1932) (warranty of sale "is understood ordinarily to
apply only between the vendor and the immediate purchaser), although, as stated in the text,
the rule was sometimes relaxed in cases involving contaminated foods. Young v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018, 1018-19 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (husband who bit into a mouse was
a proper plaintiff under warranty law, even though wife had purchased the product, but claim
was against immediate, not remote, seller).
22. 93 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1939).
23. Id. at 800.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 802-03.
27. Id. at 803.
28. Id. at 803-04.
29. Id. at 804.
30. Id. at 805.
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Furthermore, the court characterized the husband in this case as
his wife's agent, since "the evidence shows that [she] 'sent' [him]
into the restaurant for the express purpose of purchasing for her the
sandwich ....

31

By the standard of that time or this, the above result is just.
But what about consumers injured by something other than food
products?

2

What courts and litigants could not accomplish through

warranty, they sought to do through negligence law. The problem
for plaintiffs is that it can be difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that the manufacturer's practices were negligent. In Klein, the trial
court had directed a verdict for the defendant on the negligence
issue, because of undisputed (and probably indisputable) evidence
that "in the manufacture of sandwiches generally, care had been
exercised."' This determination was reversed. 4 The California
Supreme Court was quite willing to conclude that only a lack of care
could have caused the wrapped sandwiches to have reached the
plaintiff in a diseased condition, despite the lack of direct evidence
on that score.'
This kind of inference was often dignified with the label res ipsa
loquitur, the doctrine that permits, but does not require, juries to
find negligence in cases where "(1) defendant had exclusive control
of the thing causing the injury and (2) the accident is of such a
nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant."36 A moment's reflection reveals the
clumsiness of fit between res ipsa and defective product cases.
First, it may not be possible to know whether the accident would
have happened in the absence of negligence: given a high enough
volume of production, even a highly responsible manufacturer will
presumably allow some defective goods to be placed in the market.
More difficult still is the problem of exclusive control, even if that
term is used liberally to mean that the product was in the defendant's hands when it became defective (rather than, as generally
required, when it caused injury). In a significant number of cases,

31. Id.
32. As might be expected, courts did not consistently limit the exception to cases involving
food. In Klein, the court cited favorably to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1915), which also excused the privity requirement
"where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous [character]"-whatever that
means. Klein, 93 P.2d at 803 (quoting Mazetti, 135 P. at 634).
33. 93 P.2d at 800.
34. Id. at 805.
35. Id. at 801.
36. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944) (citations omitted).
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it will be impossible to satisfy the requirement even on that liberal
reading of it.
The deficiencies of res ipsa in product defect cases are dramatically illustrated by Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.3 7 In Escola,

some thirty-six hours elapsed between the time the defendant's
driver delivered the Coca Cola and the bottle breaking, or exploding,
in the plaintiff's hand causing serious injury." Perhaps in part
because the defendant had not pressed the point on appeal, the
treatment of this significant time lag was terse in the majority
opinion: "[tihe evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that the bottle here involved was not damaged by any
extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant by defendant."39
Well, who knows?' °
In short, even if there are cases where res ipsa might be made
to apply without too much manipulation, Escola requires a particularly high degree of maneuvering. Given the court's eagerness to
find the manufacturer liable here-a willingness shared by other
courts of that era"-why not simply apply a rule of strict liability
and be done with it? The simplest answer is that courts were just
not ready to do so. Although the case law increasingly sided with
the plaintiffs, courts gave away their generally conservative nature
in refusing to make liability strict in tort, although warranty law, as
we have seen, was contorted to serve that purpose. As late as 1960,
just three years before the ground-breaking, strict liability decision
in Greenman v. Yuba Products,Inc.,42 and sixteen years afterEscola,
no less an authority than William Prosser predicted that acceptance
of strict liability would not be quick. "Thus far there has been
relatively little indication that the time is yet ripe for what may
very possibly be the law of fifty years ahead."'3 Yet, aside from
37. Id. at 436.
38. Id. at 437-38.
39. Id. at 439.
40. The case would have been more difficult still had the driver not been employed by the
bottler, because then the driver's conduct would also have presented opportunity for misuse
of the product. The problem of establishing that the defect would not have been created
without negligence was also thorny in Escola. Id. at 439-40.
41.

See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

11-12 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing succinctly the rise of, and problems with, res ipsa loquitur in
product defect cases).
42. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
43. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1120 (1960). Oddly, though, at an earlier point in the article Prosser
discussed several recent cases that had applied strict liability in tort beyond the foodstuffs,
or inherently dangerous, cases. Id. at 1110-14. Although he found the "wall [to be] still
stoutly defended," id. at 1110, he also stated that these cases gave "the definite impression
that the dam has busted," id. at 1113. For present purposes, it is worth noting that, although
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noting the presumably dire consequence that strict liability would
take in everyone along the chain of manufacture, distribution and
sale, Prosser's own logic impelled in favor of such liability. In fact,
each of the good reasons Prosser cited for moving to strict liability
had been laid out by Justice Traynor more than fifteen years
earlier."
The persuasive force of Justice Traynor's opinion resides in its
appeal to both the practical and the normative. As the majority
decision itself in Escolainadvertently makes clear, defective product
cases had bent res ipsa into a shape that would have been unrecognizable to its creators.' The step Traynor advocated was short,
inasmuch as "the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict
liability."'
Accordingly, "[i]t is needlessly circuitous to make
negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality
liability without negligence."4 7 Further, he noted that warranty law
had been set free of its hallmark requirement of privity through a
series of fictions, especially in the foodstuffs cases.' "[A] warranty
runs with the chattel [or] the cause of action of the dealer is
assigned to the consumer [or] the consumer is a third party
beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer."4 9 Even
in cases involving other products, the privity requirement was
routinely hurdled through the chain of lawsuits running up from
consumer through retailer and wholesaler' to manufacturer, in a
process Justice Traynor also described as "needlessly circuitous. " ' °
These doctrinal alterations, Justice Traynor argued, were
understandable in view of changed circumstances in the relationship between manufacturer and consumer. "As handicrafts have
been replaced by mass production with its great markets and
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer
Justice Traynor's own decision in Greenman, 377 P.2d at 897, is usually cited as the
breakthrough case on strict liability, his concurrence in Escola had begun to bear fruit sooner.
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Greenman.
44. Prosser, supra note 43, at 1120 (crediting Justice Traynor's opinion with first
articulating the "risk spreading" argument for strict liability).
45. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 372 (2000) (discussing the "ancestor" of the
doctrine, Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863)).
46. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). One
might question'this conclusion by noting that res ipsa creates only an inference of negligence,
which the jury is free to reject, while strict liability eliminates the question of reasonableness
entirely. This is true, but of little practical effect. As Prosser noted, once the res ipsa
inference is made, "a jury verdict for the defendant on the negligence issue is virtually
unknown." Prosser, supra note 43, at 1115.
47. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 442.
49. Id.

50. Id.
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and the consumer. has been altered."5
The incidents of this
transformation justify both the consumer's right to rely on the
manufacturer and the latter's responsibility for injuries caused by
defective products. The consumer's inability to inspect massproduced and plentiful products, her concomitant forced reliance on
the safety of those products, and the manufacturer's participation
in that reliance through aggressive marketing meant, for Traynor,
that the manufacturer should be compelled to stand behind its
goods. It should not be permitted to escape liability merely because
"the marketing of a product has become so complicated as to require
52
one or more intermediaries."
The opacity of the manufacturing and marketing processes, in
turn, creates difficulties of proof for the product-injured consumer
that further support imposing liability without fault. The consumer
"is not ordinarily in a position to refute" the manufacturer's
evidence, Justice Traynor correctly noted, because he/she "can
hardly be [as] familiar with the manufacturing process as the
manufacturer."5 3 As a kind of corollary, the manufacturer will be
more disposed to adhere to rigid quality and safety standards when
liability is strict, as it then loses the economic benefit conferred by
the indeterminacy of the negligence-finding apparatus.'
Finally, the manufacturer is better positioned to spread the loss
caused by injury, whether through self-insurance or third-party
insurance, with the added cost passed on to consumers as a class.
It has been noted that this last argument proves too much, as it
could as much justify imposing strict liability for an injury caused
by the manufacturer's truck delivering the goods to market as for
defects in the goods themselves.' This point is well taken only if
considered in isolation. Justice Traynor's observation about cost
spreading is powerful in conjunction with his perceptive points on
the relative helplessness of the consumer in product-defect cases
and the related difficulties of proof. Neither factor is present in the
vehicular accident case, as it is equally likely that the injured party

51. Id. at 443.

52. Id
53. Id. at 441.
54. This indeterminacy operates in the defendant's favor given the burden of proof in
negligence cases. It is multiplied where the product is open for inspection, or is altered, by
sellers downstream from the manufacturer. See generally John G. Cuhane, Real and
ImaginedEffects of Statutes Restrictingthe Liabilityof Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective
Products,95 DicK. L. REv. 287 (1991) (discussing complexities raised by the participation of
non-manufacturing sellers).
55. See, e.g., Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624, 628 (Or. 1965).
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was negligent as that the manufacturer's driver was, and the proof
problems, as a class, are faced equally by both parties.'
In sum, Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola understands a
changed reality and is not afraid to adapt the law to reflect it. It
would be almost twenty years, though, before he could command a
majority of the California Supreme Court to vindicate his vision. In
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,5" Traynor, in the final
decade of his outstanding judicial career," wrote for a unanimous
court in announcing a principle of strict liability for latent product
defects, 9 a principle whose justification he did not recanvass at
length. It comes down to this: "Implicit in the [product's] presence
on the market [is] a representation that it would safely do the jobs
for which it was built."' When that expectation is dramatically
frustrated by personal injury, liability should be-and has largely
remained-strict.
Indeed, Justice Traynor's insight-that representation inheres
in the product's very presence in the market-was insufficiently
noticed by those who, with Prosser," maintained that the choice
between strict liability and negligence in latent defect cases is quite
small, given the court's willingness to permit, and the jury's to
accept, the inference generated by res ipsa. Given the helplessness
of the consumer in true latent defect cases, strictly enforcing the
obligations such representations create is consistent with a
consumer-expectation model of product defect. These expectations
have been frustrated most dramatically in personal injury cases,
whether or not the manufacturer has been negligent in creating the
defect. The American Law Institute caught up to Traynor in 1964,
when it produced the Restatement (Second) of Torts.62 Section
402(A) provided that strict liability for defective products would
apply when the product's danger exceeded what would be expected
by a reasonable consumer.' Thus, it has come to be recognized that
56. This is not to be confused with the employer's liability, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, for any negligence on the part of its employees.
57. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
58. Justice Traynor served on the California Supreme Court from 1940 to 1970. See John
W. Poulos, The JudicialPhilosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643, 1643 (1995).
Professor Poulos cites a staggering array of praise for Traynor's work, coming from scholars,
judges, lawyers and the press. Id. at 1643-45.
59. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.
60. Id. at 901.

61. Prosser, supra note 43, at 1114-15, 1120.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1964).
63. Restatement (Second)of Torts section 402(A) imposes strict liability for "unreasonably
dangerous" products and then goes on to define unreasonably dangerous articles as those that
are "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
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strict liability, while often only marginally improving the injured
party's chances of success at trial, both enforces the obligations of
product makers and takes seriously the expectations that manufacturers themselves create and upon which they trade.
III. BAKER'S PROMISE
The difference between marriage and the "virtually equivalent"
civil union status is as small as the practical difference between
strict liability and negligence in product defect cases. That is not to
say that, in both cases, one cannot imagine situations in which the
choice of words would matter. A manufacturer might be able to
demonstrate its use of state-of-the-art quality control, thereby
dispelling the inference of negligence; then, only a theory of strict
liability would carry the day. In a parallel way, a same-sex couple
residing in Vermont will doubtless find that their civil union is less
portable than marriage. If one member of the couple were hospitalized while vacationing in a different state, the "almost spouse" could
encounter difficulty using his/her civil union status to visit the other
person in the hospital. Of course, the neighboring state might also
refuse to recognize even a same-sex marriage, but it is predictable
that the couple's difficulties would, in all, be greater with something
less than marriage." In the hospital case, for example, even if the
state did not recognize the couple's marriage, the hospital itself
might be more willing to honor a marital relationship than the
unfamiliar (and still different) civil union.'
Inasmuch as the
consumer who purchases it." Id. at cmt. i. Obviously, products that have latent defects,
whether of manufacture or design, are dangerous in this way. The Restatement (Third)of
Torts: Products Liability has confused the issue of consumer expectation considerably. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (1998). As to manufacturing
defects, disappointed consumer expectations are expressly invoked in section 2(a). More than
any other type of defect, "manufacturing defects disappoint [consumer] expectation." Id. at
cmt. c. As to design defects, though, the picture is much less clear. Frustrated expectations,
standing alone, do not suffice for a finding of defect, although they may "substantially
influence," id. at cmt. g, or "even be ultimately determinative," id., on that issue, in ways not
spelled out. Section 3 creates an independent basis for a finding of defect, allowing an
inference to that effect for injuries "of a kind that ordinarily occurH as a result of product
defect[s]." Id at § 3. Section 3 will capture some of the cases involving latently defective
design, but perhaps not all. For an effective criticism of the failure to consistently value
consumer expectations, see Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265-67
(1994) (pointing out that the strict liability remaining for manufacturing defects now
constitutes an exception that reveals the inadequacy of the general rule).
64. See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage:An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law,
Same-Sex Marriage,and Separatebut (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 137-44 (2000) (arguing
that civil unions are likely to pose greater portability problems for same-sex couples than
marriage would have).
65. I have only scratched the skin of a very deep problem, one that could easily be the
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legislature followed the majority's mandate to confer on same-sex
couples "the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law
to married opposite-sex couples,' 6 though, the real legal differences
between marriage and its same-sex equivalent seem rather small.

substance of a complete article. Part of the problem is that it is unclear whether civil union
status will be of benefit to anyone other than Vermont residents. Although the legality of
marriage is typically judged by universal recognition, the more recent, and inconsistently
defined, domestic partnership is a local creature. The Vermont legislature has sought to
make civil union, which is much more than a domestic partnership but still not marriage,
portable in the same way that marriage has been. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18,§ 5160(a), assumes that non-residents may be issued a civil union license. "The
license shall be issued by the clerk of the town where either party resides or, if neither is a
resident of the state, by any town clerk in the state." Id. (emphasis added). It is, therefore,
inevitable that some same-sex couples will go to Vermont, be certified as civil unions, and
return home with hopes of having their unions recognized. Whether the couple's state of
residence will recognize this status is a wide-open question: the federal government and more
than half the states have recently passed laws and constitutional amendments defining
marriage as between a man and a woman. For a compilation of laws encompassing such
changes see Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriageas a Story About Language:
Linguistic Failureand the Priorityof a Living Language, 34 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 385, 394
n.22 (1999). During the primary season of the 2000 Presidential Campaign, California
became the "hot spot" in terms of "defending" marriage. See Carol Ness, Prop. 22 Passage
Mar. 8, 2000, at Al, LEXIS, News Library. On
Forces Gays to Regroup, S.F. EXAMIMN,
March 7, voters approved Proposition 22, validating only marriages between a man and a
woman. Id.
The odd lacuna in the language used in statutes that define marriage as between a
man and a woman is that, by their terms, they do not prevent the recognition of any status
other than marriage. This omission may be "remedied," however, in the wake of
developments in Vermont. An early indication of trouble comes from Nebraska, where the
state constitution was just amended to block recognition of "the uniting of two persons of the
same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship...."
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29. It is a cruel irony that this new section appears in the state's socalled Bill of Rights. In most states, however, it remains open for a civil union couple to argue
that their state's defense of marriage laws do not apply to them. Even where such statutes
are absent or do not apply, it is unclear whether other states are obliged to recognize same-sex
unions, however labeled. See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage,
51 FLA. L. REV. 799, 804-06 (1999) (arguing that states should not use a public policy
exception to decline recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other states, but should
employ non-political choice of law principles). This question, or the more fundamental
question of whether states must, as an initial matter, allow same-sex unions, can be predicted
to come before the U.S. Supreme Court at some point. Although these points are not
addressed'in any of the three Baker opinions, the majority's repeated reference to the rights
of" Vermonters" (the term itself is used seven times by my count) signals the Vermont court's
unwillingness to reach beyond its own borders. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867-912 (Vt.
1999). Indeed, the court pointedly declined to reach beyond the state's own constitutional
Common Benefits Clause. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7. Given the opprobrium that would attach
to the state responsible for unleashing same-sex marriage on the nation, the court's cautious
approach is certainly politically understandable. As Justice Johnson points out, though, the
court has the obligation to decide the case before it-an obligation that it dodges by issuing
"little more than a declaration of rights." Baker, 744 A.2d at 904 (Johnson, J., concurring in
part).
66. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the hospital visitation example indirectly makes that
point.67
A. The Requirement of Formal Equality
But, just as Justice Traynor's concurrence understood the
importance of insisting that manufacturers stand behind their
products, Justice Johnson's opinion reveals a deep understanding of
the requirements for real equality, and the proper place of the
judiciary in ensuring it. She brings to the case a rich understanding
of the'importance of marriage itself and, therefore, the necessity of
granting plaintiffs access to that institution, not some newly
machined, virtual equivalent. Her commitment to true equality-an
anti-caste principle-is evident both in her disagreement with the
(non)remedy the court orders and in her recognition that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage perpetuates the
historical inequality of that institution.
Justice Johnson begins with a concise plea to simply require the
state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples. This exhortation straightforwardly places same-sex and opposite-sex couples on
the same plane, so as to "create reliable expectations that would
stabilize the legal rights and duties of all couples."' Granting a
marriage license-which, after all, is what the plaintiffs sought-is
the simplest way to achieve that goal, and so commends itself. The
radical theme of Johnson's disagreement as to the remedy is, it
seems: "What's the big deal?" She states: "This case concerns the
secular licensing of marriage.... [A] marriage license merely acts
as a trigger for state-conferred benefits."' 9 By emphasizing the
banality of the process, this language represents a kind of legal
distillate: this secular institution should be available to all couples
who desire admission to it.v0 Equality so demands." With elegant
67. Of course, state law will impose additional legal disabilities on civilly united couples
who move out of Vermont, in part because of the various defense of marriage acts that have
been passed. For example, an employee of a certain corporation might find that the benefits
afforded to her same-sex partner in Vermont would not follow the couple if the employee were
transferred to another state. While the couple would have the same rights as a married
couple in Vermont (including a right to employer-conferred benefits available to married
persons), upon moving it might shed that status.
68. Baker, 744 A.2d at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
69. Id. at 898-99.
70. This is true prima facie. The state may shepherd forth justifications for disallowing
particular couples, or classes of them, from marrying. All of the justices agreed, however, that
the state had not done so in the case of same-sex couples. The point is explored further in the
text.
71. I made the same point in John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-
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simplicity, Justice Johnson avoids the deep debate concerning the
social and religious significance of marriage.
Unfortunately, though, this tidy argument will not do the trick
by itself. Although there is a presumption that the state's obligation
to issue marriage licenses extends to all couples who want them, it
may be overcome by showing a "sufficiently strong" state interest for
refusing such a license. I have deliberately used the non-committal
term "sufficiently strong" because the Baker opinion is unusually
blurry in this regard.72 The majority (three of five on this issue
alone)73 formally renounced any allegiance to conventional equal
protection analysis, by which courts employ different tiers of
analysis depending on the class of person affected or nature of the
right asserted.74 The court opted instead for a more general
balancing test, by which it will hereafter decide whether a classification that "includes some members of the community . . . but

excludes others... is reasonably necessary to accomplish the State's
claimed objectives."'
Whatever this general balancing test requires, the state did not
meet it. On this point, the court was unanimous.76 Boiled down, the
court's central findings on the state's justification for excluding
same-sex couples were that the link between procreation and childrearing, while cognizable, would not be impaired by permitting
same-sex couples to marry, and that the deprivations occasioned by
Sex Marriage,20 CARDozo L. REv. 1119, 1180-82 (1999). The positive argument for same-sex
marriage, anchored in principles of fundamental equality, is disarmingly simple to make. See
id. It is also not enough, for reasons I develop later in this Essay. See infra Part III.B.
72. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
73. In addition to Justice Johnson's partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice

Dooley wrote a separate concurrence. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889-97 (Dooley, J., concurring). His
sole, but significant, disagreement with the majoritywas on the issue of how to analyze claims
arising under the Common Benefits Clause. In his view, the decision to abandon the layered
approach to equal protection issues (as translated by the Vermont State Constitution into the
requirement of Common Benefits) in favor of a kind of totality of the circumstances approach
was a mistake. Id. On this point, Justices Dooley and Johnson were in agreement. Id. at 907
n.13 (Johnson, J., concurring in part) ("I share Justice Dooley's concern ... with the majority's
approach.").
74. The Vermont court ably summarized the three-tiered approach. Baker, 744 A.2d at
870 n.3 (for suspect classes or where fundamental rights are at stake, scrutiny is strict; for
issues of gender or illegitimacy, the law must have a "substantia[] relat[ionship] to a
sufficiently important governmental interest;" for other classifications, the law must simply
have a rational basis). As the court later points out, though, the Supreme Court has recently

made "unacknowledged departures" from its own framework. Id. at 872 n.5 (citing Cass R.
Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 6, 59-61 (1996)); see also

Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection,Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 619-22, 628-34 (2000) (examining the application of
rational scrutiny in recent Supreme Court decision concerning gay rights).
75. Baker, 744 A.2d at 878.

76. Id.
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exclusion from the state-conferred benefits of marriage were
substantial." Thus, the court's balancing test weighed heavily in
favor of same-sex couples.
Notwithstanding this result, the majority's decision to jettison
the tiered approach to equal protection (or, in Vermont, common
benefits) cases is worth some discussion. As Justice Dooley
exhaustively demonstrated in his concurrence, with which Justice
Johnson agreed,7' the move is a wholesale repudiation of the
decisional law holding that cases involving fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications deserve more searching
scrutiny than cases involving, say, economic discrimination.79
Dooley fears, probably with some justification, that the new
balancing approach may be "ignored... in the future."' Given the
sacrifice in predictability brought about by this shift, why did the
court make the change? More to the point, why now?
I suspect that the answer has something to do with a residual
discomfort with the notion that gays and lesbians deserve the full
panoply of civil rights afforded everyone else. This conclusion may
seem uncharitable in view of the court's "recognition of our common
humanity,"81 and its statement that the couple's rights should be
vindicated "not because they are part of a 'suspect class,' but
because they are part of the Vermont community.8 2 Nonetheless,
the timing of the collapse of categories, together with a few clues
from the language of the decision, offer at least some support for
this reading. The first sign of trouble is that the court is at pains to
disagree with Justice Johnson's belief that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry amounts to a form of sex discrimination.'
If discrimination on the basis of gender would simply be run
77. Id. at 881-84. The state made other arguments, but the court disposed of these rather
quickly, in part because the state's position on same-sex marriage was "diametrically at odds"

with its generally progressive legislation on gay issues. Id. at 884. For example, the
contention that exclusion of same-sex couples was necessary to -promot[e] child rearing in
a setting that provides both male and female role models,' id., was belied by "a law removing
all prior legal barriers to the adoption of children by same-sex couples." Id.
78. Id. at 908 n.3 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
79. Id. at 893 (Dooley, J., concurring). Dooley noted that Vermont's former approach is

also consistent with that followed by the federal courts and other state courts. Id. at 896-97.
80. Id. at 889. He also feared how it might be applied, since "the State now bears no
higher burden to justify discrimination against African-Americans or women than it does to
justify discrimination against large retail stores." Id. at 894. As explained later, infra notes

97-105 and accompanying text, there is reason to believe that the court will continue to
demand a greater justification for state action in areas usually thought to trigger strictscrutiny analysis.
81. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
82. Id. at 878 n.10.
83. Id. at 880 n.13.
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through the same balancing test as the discrimination against
same-sex couples was in this case, why not simply point that out
and be done with it? Instead, the court noted that "discriminat[ion]
on the basis of sex would bear a heavy burden" of justification."
Similarly, in its disagreement with Johnson on the remedy issue,
the majority stated: "We do not confront in this case the evil [of
institutionalized racism . . . ."
As Johnson pointed out, this
statement "implies that our duty to remedy unconstitutional
discrimination is somehow limited when that discrimination is
based on sex or sexual orientation rather than race."' Finally, and
most directly, the court noted that "the overwhelming majority of
decisions have rejected [claims] .. . that lesbians and gay men are
a suspect class."8 7 Although there is a strong argument that
consistent state policy in Vermont supports treating gays as a
suspect class,' and despite the fact that the court did not decide the
issue, there is at least some evidence in the majority's decision to
suggest a lingering discomfort with fully recognizing the rights of
gays and lesbians.8'
One reason for the court's diffidence may be a simple desire to
keep its options open in this case. Consider what may occur in the
aftermath of the Vermont decision. The legislature granted the full
package of rights held by opposite-sex couples to same-sex couples,
but withheld the approbation of the word "marriage.' ° Now
suppose that a civilly united couple brings a suit claiming that the
legislative remedy is not complete, perhaps because of the added
difficulties the couple would likely face outside the state.91 In that
instance, the court could say that the balancing now weighs in favor
84. Id.
85. Id. at 887.
86. Id. at 902 n.5 (Johnson, J., concurring in part). In fairness, this conclusion is only an
implication. As the court pointed out, racial segregation was the very point of segregation
statutes, whereas Vermont's marriage statutes were not drafted for the purposes of excluding
same-sex couples, since the possibility of such marriages was unimaginable at that time in
Western society.
87. Id. at 902 n.10.
88. Id. at 890-91 (Dooley, J., concurring) (noting that the state's legislative policies, which
include the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, are considerably more

gay-friendly than most states').
89. As noted earlier, the decision may have been politically wise. The majority may have
feared legislative overreaction from a directive to issue marriage licenses. The argument here

is simply that the court's commitment to full equality for gays and lesbians is less than fully
clear from the language of the decision.
90. See discussion and sources cited supra note 4. Professor Cox regards the legislative

decision to begin the civil union law with a finding that marriage still means the union of a
man and a woman as showing the "thin disguise" of equality. Cox, supra note 64, at 127.
91. See discussion supra Part III; see also Cox, supra note 64, at 137-44.
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of the state.' The couple's interest is significantly less because of
the possibly small set of problems that would remain, so the state
might succeed on a less-than-powerful showing: perhaps some
vague concern about problems it might face by becoming known as
the "gay marriage state." By anchoring its analysis in the couple's
interest in having the same rights as opposite-sex couples, rather
than in a presumption that such discrimination is targeted at
members of a marginalized or suspect group, the court might have
provided itself with a tool for continuing the political compromise
ushered in by Baker.
B. Beyond Formal Equality
Another reason for the inadequacy of a stand-alone, formal
argument for equality is that the moral bracketing-the consignment of values to arenas other than the judiciary-it seeks to
achieve is neither possible nor desirable. Ultimately, the argument
for same-sex marriage will succeed only when it comes to be seen as
a good thing, not "merely" something required by the mechanical
application of a set of neutral legal principles. Commentators are
beginning to recognize the importance of arguments about values in
this area,93 and Justice Johnson's opinion did too, albeit inconsistently. She made two related points, on one of which she expressly
declined to reach a conclusion (although her sympathies are clear
enough). 4 Together, these points form the core of the opinion's
radical promise of equality.
The first point is a short step from the formal guarantee of
equal treatment of citizens under the law. In a lengthy footnote,
Justice Johnson addressed the argument that even a domestic
partnership type of scheme that placed same-sex couples on the
same legal plane as opposite-sex couples would still, by withholding
the term and, therefore, the status of marriage, fail to solve the
problem of unequal status.9 She cited, with evident approval, both
92. See Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93,
110 (2000) ("Under the majority's balancing approach, the constitutionality of legislation that
failed to achieve complete equality of benefits depended . . . on the [clourt's subjective
evaluation of the significance of the benefits excluded.").
93. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 109-15 (1996); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations
for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J.
1871, 1930-35 (1997); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctionsof Form or Substance: Monogamy,
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage,75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1594-1615 (1997); Culhane, supra

note 71, at 1130.
94. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part).

95. Id. at 899 n.2.
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commentators and courts on this point,' including the Supreme
Court's observation that "laws singling out gays and lesbians for
special treatment 'raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected."' 7 Here, though, Johnson's sensible conclusion that the
simple act of granting a marriage license would be the most direct
remedy, as well as being the result the plaintiffs sought, led her to
demur on the social stigma point: "Because enjoining defendants
from denying plaintiffs a marriage license is the most effective and
complete way to remedy the constitutional violation... [, it is not
necessary to reach the issue of whether depriving plaintiffs of the
'status' of being able to obtain... [a] marriage license.., violates
their civil rights.' g
If a suit challenging the completeness of the legislative remedy
is brought, Justice Johnson may be asked to answer the question
she (properly) declined to decide in Baker. Stated provocatively, the
question would reduce to whether the state could impose a separatebut-equal system for licensing couples. We know that, in the
context of race, government-mandated separation is "inherently
unequal ,'o9 and Justice Johnson's opinion strongly suggests that the
same is true in the context of sexual orientation, even in the
unlikely event that formal equality could be attained. This warning
should be heeded.
If the court is called upon to decide whether same-sex couples
must be afforded the right to marriage, per se, two related points
from Brown v. Boardof Education'o should guide its consideration.
First, marriage, like education, is a fundamental incident of
citizenship.1 ° ' Both come directly from the state, which should not
be a party to the creation of caste.'
Consider the surprising ease
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,634 (1996)).
98. Id.
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
100. Id. at 483.
101. In Brown, the Supreme Court described education as "the very foundation of good
citizenship." Id. at 493. One difference between the two is that marriage is not a foundation
of citizenship so much as a right of citizens.
102. Although the right to marry and the right to an education are basic, they are generally
regulated by the individual states. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)
(education); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (marriage).
Both, however, enjoy some level of heightened federal constitutional protection. The Court
in Brown stated that education is "perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments," Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, and the Court has, on other occasions, stated that,
while education is not a fundamental right, the state must show a "substantial... interest"
in order to deny its benefits, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Marriage, on the other
hand, is a fundamental right. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-85.
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with which I have adapted a passage from Brown to the same-sex
marriage setting: "To separate [people] from others of similar...
qualifications solely because of their [sexual orientation] generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community. . .. "l
Second, Brown assumed the equality of tangible things, but found
that "the effect of segregation itself' violates the guarantee of equal
protection.'
By parity of reasoning, the pure inequality that
remains under the compromise institution, civil union, should be
found to offend principles of status neutrality.1" 5
The other strand of Justice Johnson's argument that transcends
legal formalism provides additional support for the conclusion that
she would find this same-sex/opposite-sex centrifuge unacceptable."° It may be useful to begin exploration of this point where
Johnson does: by recognizing that the ban on same-sex marriage is
a form of sex discrimination.' This point seems initially debatable.
One can say, with the majority, that banning same-sex marriages
discriminates against neither sex because both sexes are equally
disabled. Women can't marry women and men can't marry men;
therefore, neither sex is at a disadvantage.'
There are two related responses to this conclusion. The first is
simple, while the second is radical. The logic of the first response
is this: even though taken overall, neither sex is discriminated
against, in an individual case sex discrimination does occur.
Consider Justice Johnson's example:
Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician.
Dr. A may do so because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because
Dr. B is a woman. Dr. A and Dr. B are people of the opposite
sexes who are similarly situated in the sense that they both
want to marry a person of their choice. The statute disqualifies
Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of her sex .... This is
sex discrimination.'o9

103. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
104. Id. at 492.
105. See Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 22. But see
Kujovich, supra note 92, at 96 (suggesting that the court might see civil unions as "different
but equal" and, therefore, constitutional).
106. Baker, 744 A.2d at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
107. Id.

108. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
109. Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60
(Haw. 1993) (treating some couples differently from others amounts to sex discrimination);
ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUmAN RiGHTs 205-07 (1995) (decrying

'mirror image" symmetry that attempts to justify one kind of discrimination with another).
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Justice Johnson selected a particularly apt example in further
support of her view. A statute might "requir[e] courts to give
custody of male children to fathers and female children to mothers."
She is correct (and unchallenged by the majority) in concluding that
such a statute would amount to impermissible sex discrimination,
even though men and women were visited with an equal disqualification."1
This example is sublime, because it simultaneously
resolves the formal argument and moves the reader to examine why
the conclusion is so obvious in this case, as it is not (perhaps) in the
marriage context. The custody illustration thus oils the transition
to Johnson's second response, which forms the radical core of her
opinion.
A custody rule requiring a matching of the parent-child genders
would fail, among other reasons, for its unstated but obvious
assumptions about the natural affinity of fathers and sons, and of
mothers and daughters. While such an affinity is, of course, often
present, in particular instances the reverse might be true, or the
child might have equal affinity for both parents. Such a law would
rightly be condemned for embodying discredited gender stereotyping
in legislative requirement. Although not as apparent, denying
same-sex couples the right to marry amounts to a form of sex
discrimination, because it is animated by "a vestige of sex-role
stereotyping that applies to both men and women.""' Justice
Johnson concluded that Vermont may not differentiate between
same-sex and opposite-sex marriages if doing so only "giv[es]
credence to generally discredited sex-role stereotyping.""1
Reading the state's view of marriage both historically and
broadly, Justice Johnson noted that, until little more than acentury
ago, "the marriage laws imposed sex-based roles for the partners to
a marriage-male provider and female dependent-that bore no
relation to their inherent abilities to contribute to society."" Of
course, the requirement that marriage consist of one man and one
woman does not, by itself, say anything about such roles. But it is
clear that laws relating to marriage licenses embodied these longstanding assumptions of gender roles because the surrounding legal
terrain did. Marriage swallowed whole a woman's very legal
existence. "[Sihe merged with her husband and held no separate
rights to enter into a contract or execute a deed. ... She could not

110.
111.
112.
113.

Baker, 744 A.2d at 905 n.10 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 906.
Id. at 905 n.11 (citations omitted).
Id. at 908.
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sue without her husband's consent or be sued without joining her
husband as a defendant." 4
The bundle of laws negating the legal existence of women is
gone," 5 but the requirement that marriage be reserved for unions
of one man and one woman remains. Thus, it is appropriate to ask
whether the "sex-based classification.., is simply a vestige of the
common-law unequal marriage relationship or whether there is
some valid governmental purpose for the classification today."" 6
One might be tempted to argue, with the majority, that this inquiry
is improper because one should look at the motivations of those who
drafted the marriage laws. As there is no evidence that "the authors
of the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect
and discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about
gender role confusion,""' the sex discrimination argument might be
thought to fail.
This static view of constitutional interpretation, however, is at
odds with the Vermont court's own precedent. In MacCallum v.
Seymour's Administrator," the court struck down a statute
prohibiting adopted children from inheriting from collateral heirs
because the statute "restled] on outdated presumptions not
reasonable today when vast cultural and social changes have
occurred."" 9 Whatever the legislature's intent in enacting a law, its
continued validity is judged in light of contemporary conditions.
The MacCallum court provided a useful, if banal, illustration of this
principle in discussing an earlier case invalidating the law requiring
adjoining landowners to share the cost of a division fence.'
Although that law made sense when '"the land was predominantly
open and farmed, and most rural landowners were also livestock
owners,'"' 2 ' today it amounts to a confiscation by one landowner
against another. The court considers the constitutionality of a law
in light of contemporary conditions.
Measured by this standard, the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the benefits of marriage fails. Justice Johnson concluded that
the state's justifications are either "tautological, wholly arbitrary,
or based on impermissible assumptions about the roles of men and
114. Id.
115. Id. (describing the development of women's legal rights in marriage).
116. Id. at 909.
117. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
118. 686 A.2d 935, 939-41 (Vt. 1996).
119. Baker, 744 A.2d at 909 (Johnson, J., concurring in part) (citingMacCallum,686 A.2d
at 939-41).
120. MacCallum, 686 A.2d at 939.
121. Id. (quoting Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 460 (Vt. 1989)).
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women."122 It is in discussing this latter class of defenses that the
opinion attains its transforming power. The idea of "uniting men
and women to celebrate the 'complementarity'... of the sexes and
providing male and female role models for children"' is an echo of
natural law arguments propounded by such legal scholars as John
Finnis.12' The state's justifications, as summarized by Johnson, are
worth quoting in full because they represent a mainstream synopsis
of the reconstructed natural law argument we can expect to see in
every state, when same-sex marriage arises as an issue:
(1) [Mlarriage unites the rich physical and psychological
differences between the sexes; (2) [Slex differences strengthen
and stabilize a marriage; (3) [E]ach sex contributes differently
to a family unit and to society; and (4) [Ulniting the different
male and female qualities and contributions in the same
institution instructs the young of the value of such a union.125
Using these gender-based differences as a kind of springboard,
the state then pointed to the gains achieved by bringing diversity,
of gender and of race, to society: women and minorities have a
different voice." This seductive argument, however, confuses the
laudable goal of community diversity with the relationship between
two people. True diversity in marriage would be further promoted,
as Justice Johnson notes, by requiring "all marriages to be between
people, not just of the opposite sex, but of different races, religions,
national origins, and so forth...."2 Whatever may be the case on
122. Baker, 744 A.2d at 911 (Johnson, J., concurring in part). The discussion in the text
concerns only the last of these three inadequacies. For the sake of completeness, I note here

that the tautological argument was that, in essence, the status quo should be preserved. It
is obvious that the state wishes that to be so, or it would not be defending the law. So this is
no argument at all. Id. at 910. The arbitrary arguments were those that were plainly
inconsistent with other expressed policies of the state. As one example, the state urged that
the "prohibition may deter uses of technologically assisted reproduction by same-sex'couples."
Id. at 910. The state, however, does not deter such uses by opposite-sex couples, nor is there
any other indication in Vermont law that the state disfavors such technologies. Id. Similarly,
the state's interest in preventing marriages of convenience is no different whether the couple
is same-sex or opposite-sex. Id. at 911.
123. Id. at 909.
124. E.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "SexualOrientation,"69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049 (1994). In fairness to the state of Vermont, Finnis' argument is that even sexual conduct
between two members of the same sex violates natural law. Id. at 1069-70. Inasmuch as
Vermont long ago abolished its proscriptions against particular forms of consensual intimate
contact, Baker, 744 A.2d at 885, it would presumably not urge upon the court this version of
a natural law argument.
125. Baker, 744 A.2d at 909 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 910.
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the community level, on the intimate level of a committed couple the
state's natural law argument "is sex stereotyping of the most
retrograde sort."'28 Any two people might be more or less
stereotypically masculine or feminine, whether those terms are
defined in terms of historic role-who works outside the home, who
inside, for example-or in terms of assumptions about behavior or
"nature." As applied to a couple, "in short, the 'diversity' argument
29
is based on illogical conclusions from stereotypical imaginings."'
As Johnson noted, the Supreme Court has struck down sex-based
classifications that "rely on overbroad generalizations about
different talents, capabilities, or preferences of males and
females." 3 ' Vermont's prohibitions on same-sex marriages fall into
this category.
I have gone a step further, arguing that same-sex marriage
would be healthy for marriage in general. By distancing itself from
archaic assumptions about the scripted roles of men and women, the
state would "unleash a great positive force, by encouraging the
creative reconsideration of the true goods of the marital
relationship." 3 ' Those goods include a reaffirmation of the value of
real commitment-untethered to role-and the unleashing of the
couple's real potential. In fact, one of the reasons for the vitriolic
opposition to same-sex marriage is its reinforcement of the simple
truth that men and women have already traveled a great distance
from their historically assigned roles. Occasionally, this dirty little
secret bubbles to the surface. Consider this statement by Robert
Knight of the Family Research Council: "As man is reduced in
stature, all hell will break loose. We'll see a breakdown in social
organization, with more drug use, more disease, more unwanted
pregnancies.""' While this statement was made in reference to the
perils presented by the movement toward gay equality, the women's
128. Id. I recognize a certain tension between the argument that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage reflects outdated notions of gender stereotyping and the observation
that previously excluded groups, including women, bring a different voice to enterprises to
which they are permitted access. The problem is more apparent than real, however. First,
as Justice Johnson recognized, whatever may be the case on the broader cultural level may
not be true in the instance of a particular couple. Second, often the exclusion of women from
specific realms of public life is itself grounded in essentializing notions of male and female,
which inclusion upends. As Justice Ginsburg stated in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515,550 (1996), "generalizations about the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate

for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity
place them outside the average description." Id.
129. Baker, 744 A.2d at 910 (Johnson, J., concurring in part).
130. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
131. Culhane, supra note 71, at 1198.

132. Robert Dreyfuss, The Holy War on Gays, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 18, 1999, at 38, 39-40.
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movement would seem a better fit. Same-sex marriage is simply the
more acceptable target.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Vermont Supreme Court has taken a bold step, delivering
an opinion that announces judicial commitment to basic rights of
citizenship for all: "The extension of the Common Benefits Clause
to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor
less, than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship is simply, when
13
all is said and done, a recognition of our common humanity." 3
As inspiring as this language is, the majority should have
discharged its responsibility to provide the plaintiffs with the
remedy sought. Instead, what remains is the shell of legal discrimination against same-sex couples, who have to settle for something
not-quite-marriage. The genius of Justice Johnson's opinion is its
clear-eyed recognition that justice requires more than virtual
equality. Her insistence on real equality, within the cdurt's capacity
to provide it, places her with those who are not afraid to celebrate
the fullest expression of human potential. In seeing through to
what is truly at stake, her opinion is of the same house as Justice
Traynor's. One hopes that her validation will not take twenty years.

133. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.

